whether the average physicist would know enough about them to appreciate them."5 Lecturing in Varenna, also in the early 1970s, he recalled the "profound influence" that the power and beauty of projective geometry had on him. It gave results "apparently by magic; theorems in Euclidean geometry which you have been worrying about for a long time drop out by the simplest possible means" under its sway. Relativistic transformations of mathematical quantities suddenly became easy using this geometrical reformulation. "My research work was based in pictures I needed to visualise things and projective geometry was often most useful e.g. in figuring out how a particular quantity transforms under Lorentz transf [ormation] . When I came to publish the results I suppressed the projective geometry as the results could be expressed more concisely in analytic form."6 So Dirac had one way of producing his physics in his private sphere (using geometry) and another of presenting the results to the wider community of physicists (using algebra). Nor is this a purely retrospective account. For there remains among his papers a thick folder of geometrical constructions documenting Dirac's extensive exploration of the way objects transform relativistically. These drawings are not dated but on their reverse sides are writings dated from 1922 forward. None of these drawings were ever published or, as far as I can tell, even shown to anyone (figs. 1 and 2).
The question arises: how ought we to think about Dirac's "suppressed" geometrical work? Dirac himself saw projective geometry as key to his entrance into a new field: "One wants very much to visualize the things which we are dealing with."7 Should one therefore split scientific reasoning, as Hans Reichenbach did, between a "logic of discovery" and a "logic of justification"? For Reichenbach there were some patterns of reasoning that were, in and of themselves, sufficient for public demonstration. Other procedures, more capricious and idiosyncratic, could not count as demonstrations though they might serve the acquisition of new ideas.8
This distinction saturates the philosophy of science of the postwar era. In Karl Popper's hands it helped to ground his demarcation criterion between science and nonscience: only scientific theories, in the context ofjustification, were falsifiable, only For some analysts of science, the advantages of the radical public/private distinction is that it brought the private into a psychological domain that opened it up to studies of creativity. For others, the separation permitted a more formal analysis of the context ofjustification through schemes of confirmation, falsification, or verification. For those who saw published science as merely the last step of private science, the distinction helped shift the balance of interest toward "science-in-themaking" and away from the published end product.
I want here to pose the question differently and, specifically, to challenge the search for intrinsic markers of scientific drawing that would make it in some instances "private" and in others "public." As we learn from Jacques de Caso's essay For Monge and his school, physical processes including projection, section, duality, and deformation became means of discovery, proof, and generalization. This Geometry was practical and more than practical. Certainly for Dupin, Chasles, Poncelet, and their students, geometry towered above all other forms of knowledge as the paragon of well-grounded argumentation, better grounded, in particular, than algebra. Projective geometry came to stand at that particular place where engineering and reason crossed paths, and so provided a perfect site for pedagogy. As
Monge insisted, projective geometry could play a central role in the "improvement" of the French working class "Every Frenchman of sufficient intelligence" should learn it, and, more specifically, geometry would be of great value to "all workmen whose aim is to give bodies certain forms. promptly be filled by grilling, and no quarter would be given in discussion. 36 Dirac immediately turned to the intersection of relativity with geometry and expressed his heartfelt sense that pure mathematics had nothing over the applied. On the contrary, so Dirac contended, there was a deep mathematical beauty in the specificity of the "actual world" that was obscure to the pure mathematician.37 "I think,"
Dirac penciled onto his handwritten notes, the general opinion among pure mathematicians is that applied mathematics consists of finding solutions of certain differential equations which are the mathematical expression of the laws of nature. To the pure mathematician these equations appear arbitrary. He can write down many other equations which are equally interesting to him, but which do not happen to be laws of nature. The modern physicist does not regard the equations he has to deal with as being arbitrarily chosen by nature. There is a reason, {which he has to find} why the equations are what they are, of such a nature that, when it is found, the study of these equations will be more interesting than that of any of the others.
Old Newtonian gravity had a force that varied as the distance squared but from the pure mathematician's view, there was nothing special about the square it and I feel sure that when the reason is discovered 4 dimensional space will be of more interest to the geometrician than any other." Questions of applied mathematics, questions from the physical world, would, he believed, become of central concern to the mathematician. That which is arbitrary in pure terms became fixed, definite, and unique when put into the frame of a real-world geometry,39 To draw diagrams, to picture relationships these were the starting points for grasping why the universe was as it was.
These words would have been music to Baker's ears, for he had little truck with the new, vastly more abstract, rigorous, and algebraic mathematics that was coming The effect of fears are perhaps not so obvious.
The fears are of two kinds.
The first one is the fear of putting forward a new idea which may turn out to be quite wrong.
The fear of sticking one's neck out.
perhaps having to retract and being exposed to humiliation.
It may be that such a fear acts largely subconsciously and inhibits one from making a bold step forward. A man may get close to a great discovery and fail to make the last vital step.
Possibly it is such a fear that blocks this step.46
In these highly inflected lines, Dirac explicitly touched on his own terror of the humiliating failure that abutted any chance of success, a terror expressed in an ambivalence at once drawn toward risk and success (in the form of the quantum theory he helped create) and yet recoiling with fear from possible failure and "sticking his neck" out from his own place of security. There is here a psychological story of the ambivalence of leaving home, a "home" that is conjointly familial, social, and epistemic Merchant Venturers' was the workplace of his father, his training ground in engineering, and the place of his first encounter with the projective geometry to which Fraser (and later Baker) had introduced him.
But there is a further story that is only incompletely lodged in this geography of the psychological. This other narrative entails an account of how the logic of drawing was "suppressed"; how thinking through drawing diagrams went from being celebrated across Europe in the. mid-nineteenth century to being marginalized at the beginning of the twentieth. To complete this broader narrative properly would take us into the shifting fortunes of geometry in France and Germany, and into fundamental changes in pedagogy at Cambridge.47 I have only begun to sketch here the shifting role of persuasive visibilities in physics and their function in shaping an epistemological interior life for Dirac.
The Suppression of Geometry
To the mathematical generation that came of age after 1900 in England, geometry was no longer a science with claims to being descriptive of the world.
Instead geometry, once the sun in the scientific sky, was being eclipsed by the for- When Dirac moved to Cambridge to begin studying physics, he took with him this projective geometry and used it to think. But that thinking had now to be conducted only on the inside of a subject newly self-conscious of its separation from the scientific world. Dirac's maturity was characterized again by flight, this time to
Heisenberg's algebra, an antivisual calculus that at once broke with the visual tradition in physics and with the legacy of an older school of visualizable, intuitiongrounded descriptive geometry. With an austere algebra and Heisenberg's quantum physics, Dirac stabilized his thought through instability: working through a now infolded projective geometry joined by carefully hidden passageways to the public sphere of symbols without pictures.
Freud often argued that what cannot be expressed in private is manifested in public. In a sense I am suggesting the contrary here: at the turn of the century in Britain, projective geometry was shifting away from the status of a state-endorsed liberal epistemology that joined university to factory and toward a form of knowledge that was distinctly second class. Physicalized geometry geometry grounded in spatial intuitions, visualizations, diagrammatics-collapsed under the language of an autonomous science. In a sense Dirac's suppressed drawings were the hidden remnants of an infolded Victorian world. Public geometry became private reason.
Notes
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